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Coming soon after the euphoria of the smallpox eradication 
triumph (Fig. 1), ‘the greatest achievement in public health 
in the 20th century’, polio became the next logical vaccine-
preventable disease to be targeted for eradication, even though 
the proposal was not without its detractors, including many 
of the most prominent public health authorities, some directly 
involved in the smallpox eradication.1,2 
The initial target date, 2000, unfortunately came and went 
without eradication in sight. So too did the next scheduled date 
of 2005 (a target set by Rotary International, the most important 
non-governmental supporter of the Global Polio Eradication 
Initiative). As yet no future target date has been set. Campaign 
fatigue has now become a further setback, particularly in the 
remaining endemic countries such as India where children are 
now being concealed from the immunisation teams. In another 
endemic country, Nigeria, politically motivated rumours 
which surfaced in 2003, alleging that the polio vaccine was 
maliciously adulterated with contraceptive drugs, led to a 
catastrophic resurgence of polio in that country and subsequent 
export of the virus to 20 other countries.3 The feasibility of the 
eradication of polio is again under serious question.4,5
Eradication
Infectious agents that are eradicable are those where the chain 
of transmission can be broken by an intervention such as a 
vaccine and where there is no reservoir such as chronic or 
persistent infection or a non-human host (Fig. 2).6-9 Vaccines 
are theoretically able to successively control, eliminate and 
eradicate these diseases (Table I).
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Fig. 1. The world's last recorded case of epidemic smallpox – Ali 
Maow Maalin, Somalia, 1977 (WHO photo by J Wickett).
Fig. 2. The theory behind the eradication of infectious diseases.
A: Hypothetical infectious disease with basic reproductive number, 
Ro=4, i.e. each index case infects 4 susceptibles. B: If 75% of contacts are 
successfully immunised the chain of transmission is maintained but there 
is no expansion.  If population immunity is increased above 75% the chain 
of transmission is broken and the infectious disease will disappear in that 
population provided no fresh susceptibles are introduced. 
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Smallpox, the only disease so far to be eradicated, complied 
admirably with the requirements of an eradicable disease 
(Table II).
Undoubtedly the eradication of polio will be far more 
difficult. What polio shares with smallpox is the availability of 
a highly effective and cheap vaccine and a virus restricted in 
nature to humans, with chronic persistent infections occurring 
only very rarely (discussed below). In contrast to smallpox, 
what complicates polio eradication is the much greater 
difficulty in recognition of infection, as the great majority 
(>99%) of infections are asymptomatic, greatly complicating 
surveillance and monitoring. The geopolitical climate with 
multiple conflicts throughout the world, compared with the 
Cold War smallpox era with relatively few open conflicts, has 
also greatly hindered polio immunisation efforts. 
The strategy, as with smallpox, aims to achieve maximum 
vaccine coverage to terminate the circulation of the virus 
in the population coupled with a reliable surveillance tool 
for the detection of remaining pockets of virus circulation 
and to monitor progress. Herd immunity is achieved 
with high routine vaccine coverage (at least 90% for all 3 
doses) supplemented by mass immunisation programmes 
(immunising all infants under 5 years of age independently 
of the routine immunisation programme on a single day or 
few days) and mop-up immunisation (house-to-house visits 
to reach infants missed in the mass immunisation campaign). 
Syndromic surveillance for acute flaccid paralysis (AFP), the 
most characteristic clinical presentation of polio, is used as an 
indicator of virus circulation.
What has been achieved so far?
In the two decades of the eradication initiative the incidence 
of polio has been drastically reduced by over 99%.10 It was 
estimated that there were over 350 000 cases of polio in 125 
countries in 1988 compared with 2003 when, with improved 
surveillance, only 784 cases were reported in 6 countries. 
(Unfortunately there has been a resurgence over the past 3 
years – 1 255 cases in 2004, 1 979 cases in 2005 and 1 996 cases 
in 2006, mainly as a result of the suspension of immunisation 
programmes in Northern Nigeria in 2003.11) Both polio 
vaccines, trivalent inactivated polio vaccine (TIPV) and 
trivalent oral polio vaccine (TOPV) using a live attenuated 
strain of poliovirus termed Sabin-like virus, have proven to be 
among the most successful human vaccines. The majority of 
the world’s population now live in countries certified by the 
World Health Organization as being polio free – the Americas 
in 1994, the Western Pacific Region in 2000 and the European 
Region in 2002. It would also appear that type 2 poliovirus has 
probably already been eradicated from the world – the last case 
was reported in 1999.12
Up to 30 May 2007, 183 wild-type polio cases had been 
reported globally, less that half of the 453 cases reported 
for 2006 at the same date.11 In 2006 polio was confirmed in 
17 countries, 94% (1 808 cases) in the 4 endemic countries 
of Nigeria, India, Pakistan and Afghanistan. (An endemic 
country is defined as one where the circulation has never 
been interrupted.) The worst affected country, Nigeria, was 
responsible for 56% of all cases (1 123) in 2006, followed by 
India with 34% (674). From these endemic countries, also 
referred to as reservoir countries, polio was exported to 13 
countries where collectively 128 cases (6%) were reported in 
2006.11 
What still remains to ‘finish the job’?
Strategies differ somewhat for the endemic/reservoir countries 
as for the imported countries. In the imported countries polio 
has been relatively easy to eliminate with multiple rounds of 
mass immunisation. For example, the type 1 polio outbreak in 
Namibia in 2006 was fully controlled and eliminated within 60 
days.13 Similarly the large outbreaks in 2005 in Indonesia and 
Yemen, with 303 and 478 cases respectively, were followed by 
only 2 cases and 1 case respectively in 2006.10,11,14 The situation 
in the endemic countries, however, is considerably more 
complicated. In Afghanistan and Northern Pakistan conflicts 
have hindered immunisation teams. However, the two main 
problematic regions in the world are the northern states of 
Nigeria and Uttar Pradesh and Bihar states in India. Nigeria, 
Table I.  Epidemiological modification of infectious diseases by vaccination
   Organism present in population  Surveillance  Vaccination programmes
Level 1:  Control  Yes – at low level    Required   Required
Level 2:  Elimination Only imported cases and perhaps a   Required   Required
   restricted number of contacts
Level 3:  Eradication No – not present worldwide   Not required  Not required
Table II.  Smallpox: Factors favouring eradication
• Severe disease – high mortality and sequelae
• No animal reservoir
• Very few subclinical cases
• Cases infectious only at onset of rash
• Recurrence of infectivity never occurred
• Only one serotype
• Effective, stable vaccine
• Success of earlier elimination efforts
• Favourable socio-political factors
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which is still suffering the legacy of the 2003 suspension 
of polio immunisation, is the worst affected country in the 
world with multiple lineages of type 1 virus and also type 3 
virus circulating in the population. There has however been 
considerable improvement in 2007 – 68 cases to date for 2007 
compared with 245 to the same date in 2006.11 Unfortunately 
the situation appears to have deteriorated in India, with 44 
cases up to 8 May compared with 26 to the same date in 
2006, partly due to falling immunisation coverage in parts 
of Uttar Pradesh and Bihar because of growing parental 
resistance. Even more problematic here has been the difficulty 
in achieving successful immunisation, even with multiple 
rounds of vaccination, because of very high population density, 
crowding and high levels of diarrhoeal disease interfering with 
the immunogenicity of TOPV.15 Fortunately, recent studies in 
Uttar Pradesh using high-potency monovalent type 1 polio 
vaccine, mOPV1, have demonstrated a protective efficacy about 
3 times that of TOPV and have raised hopes that multiple 
rounds (7 - 8) of mOPV1 as well as mOPV3, as appropriate, 
may be effective in eliminating transmission in this difficult 
region.16
Post-eradication planning
With the eradication goal-line on the horizon, planning for 
the post-eradication era is well underway and a number of 
significant problems and difficulties will need to be addressed, 
some of which were not envisaged at the commencement 
of the initiative.17-19 The ultimate aim of eradication, as 
currently defined, is to be able ultimately to dispense with 
control measures such as vaccination, as was the case with 
smallpox. Unfortunately, lessons from the successful smallpox 
eradication provide less guidance for the polio eradication 
initiative. Stopping polio vaccination in the future will have 
awesome implications and there would need to be convincing 
assurance that the virus would not reappear before such a 
momentous decision is taken. The risk could take the form 
of either wild-type virus escaping from a facility or vaccine-
derived polioviruses. Accidental escape of wild-type virus 
from laboratories has indeed already occurred. For example, 
as recently as 2003, 7 cases of type 2 polio, which had been 
eradicated in 1999, were caused by a recognised laboratory 
strain of polio, MEF-1.20  An escape incident has also been 
recorded from a vaccine production plant in The Netherlands 
which used wild-type virus for IPV manufacture and caused 
asymptomatic infection of a factory worker and his child.21 
Deliberate release of wild-type polio as a bioterrorist weapon 
poses a potential future risk, although this virus would make 
a very poor biological weapon because the great majority of 
infections would be sub-clinical and an effective vaccine is 
available.
Reappearance of poliovirus could also be due to virus 
derived from OPV.17-19 Although the risk of paralytic polio 
from the vaccine virus is 10 000 times less than for wild-type 
virus, 1 in 2 million for vaccine virus as against 1 in 200 for 
wild-type virus, it was this minute risk of vaccine-associated 
paralytic poliomyelitis (VAPP) that motivated most countries in 
the developed world to switch from TOPV to TIPV for routine 
immunisation. Being a live RNA virus, Sabin-like virus mutates 
in the gastrointestinal tract and in doing so may undergo 
phenotypic changes including the potential for acquiring 
neurovirulence and transmissibility. Poliovirus, both wild-type 
and Sabin-like virus, generally produce acute self-limiting 
infections of the gastrointestinal tract and do not cause chronic 
infections with persistent excretion of virus. Sabin-like viruses 
are normally not isolated from the stool beyond 1 month 
after receipt of vaccine. Conventionally vaccine viruses that 
have mutated but still have less than 1% nucleotide sequence 
changes from the original parental vaccine strain in the VP1 
gene are classified as Sabin-like viruses. Those with more than 
1% change are termed VDPV (vaccine-derived poliovirus). If 
Sabin-like virus is provided with opportunities to multiply 
beyond a month after receiving vaccine it could generate these 
neurovirulent and transmissible mutational changes. These 
opportunities could occur in children with primary humoral 
immunodeficiency, a rare inherited disorder, who may be 
unable to clear the Sabin-like virus and persistently excrete 
for months to years. To date only 31 such cases have been 
described world wide, almost all in developed countries. (It is 
deemed unlikely that such cases would survive in developing 
countries because of the long-term expense of maintenance 
therapy. Cell-mediated immunodeficiency, such as caused by 
HIV, does not result in persistent excretion.)  These viruses are 
termed iVDPV (immunodeficient vaccine-derived poliovirus). 
Secondly, opportunities for mutational change may occur when 
the virus is able to circulate between the gastrointestinal tracts 
of susceptible persons in populations where the wild-type 
virus has been eliminated but vaccination rates have fallen, 
resulting in populations highly susceptible to infection. In this 
situation Sabin-like virus often also recombines with type C 
enteroviruses in the gut, ultimately acquiring phenotypic 
characteristics of neurovirulence and transmissibility 
equivalent to those of the wild-type virus. To date, 8 outbreaks 
due to this transmissible neurovirulent mutant, termed cVDPV 
(circulating vaccine-derived poliovirus), have been described 
on three continents causing over 100 cases of paralytic polio 
and involving all three types of poliovirus.22,23 The third 
VDPV, aVDPV (ambiguous vaccine-derived poliovirus) refers 
to VDPV isolates incidentally detected by surveillance of 
environmental sites where the immune status of the virus 
excretor is unknown.
The remaining questions
Undoubtedly, the final push to eradication will be by far the 
hardest. The polio eradication initiative is soon to enter its 3rd 
decade, a far cry from the 10 years that it took for smallpox 
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to be eradicated. One of the most serious challenges that 
currently confronts the polio eradication initiative is to sustain 
the impetus of the initiative, in particular in competition with 
enormously pressing competing health needs and especially in 
the face of the doubts and scepticism.4,5 In essence, can polio be 
eradicated and should polio be eradicated?  
Can polio be eradicated?
In the remaining pre-eradication phase, what is, in reality, left 
to address is the main remnant endemic reservoir pockets of 
Northern Nigeria and Uttar Pradesh and Bihar states of India. 
Nigeria has certainly made significant progress since the 2003 
setback with less than half reported cases in 2007 compared 
with 2006 up to the same date in May, although India has 
unfortunately deteriorated from 2006 to 2007 (33 - 55 as of 30 
May),11 although promising data from recent trials of mOPV1 
in Uttar Pradesh state may give cause for optimism for this 
rather intractable region.16
More complex is the post-eradication phase and, specifically, 
the risk of wild-type virus escape and VDPV emergence. 
Several strategies are planned. A global survey of laboratories 
that have stored wild-type virus, or materials which potentially 
could contain wild-type virus, is underway throughout 
the world. Once completed, laboratories will be segregated 
into two categories – the risk elimination category and the 
risk management category. The former, comprising most 
laboratories in the world, will destroy all material potentially 
containing wild-type poliovirus. The few laboratories in the 
risk management category will need to keep material only 
under regularly supervised bio-safety level-3 containment. 
Similarly, vaccine manufacturing plants using wild-type 
virus to produce TIPV will need to propagate the virus under 
regulated BSL-3 containment and TIPV vaccination will be 
mandatory for all workers and their contacts. 
Surveillance forms a major component of the eradication 
campaign. A laboratory network co-ordinated by the WHO 
and consisting of over 125 laboratories throughout the 
world has been established and is organised in three levels 
– national laboratories for virus isolation and preliminary 
characterisation, regional reference laboratories for 
confirmation and more specialised testing and specialist 
laboratories. In the post-eradication era laboratory surveillance 
will necessarily have to continue for many years if not 
indefinitely as long as the virus is still present in laboratories.
When eradication finally arrives, most countries in the world 
which are TOPV users will have the option of either going 
‘cold turkey’ or switching to TIPV. The ‘cold turkey’ option 
refers to a synchronous cessation of TOPV where all countries 
would co-ordinate a global mass immunisation day or few 
days and then permanently cease the use of TOPV. This is 
essential to avoid ongoing use of TOPV in some countries that 
could endanger neighbouring countries who stopped TOPV 
and who would therefore be vulnerable to cVDPV. The WHO 
has planned for a stockpile of over 2 billion doses of OPV 
which could be rushed to a potential hotspot should polio 
reappear in any part of the world in the post-eradication era. 
Should polio be eradicated?
Many countries in the developed world are unlikely to cease 
immunisation in the post-eradication era because of the fear 
that the disease will recur either from accidental or deliberate 
wild-type virus release or from VDPV. Using OPV from the 
stockpile to deal with any possible future outbreak carries its 
own risks (‘fighting fire with fire’), potentially creating the 
very conditions that give rise to cVDPV, i.e. introducing OPV 
into a susceptible population. Careful planning would indeed 
be required should a vaccine response be needed to stamp out 
a future re-emerging polio focus to ensure that the remedial 
campaign is short and sharp, possibly combining TOPV with 
TIPV administered to surrounding contacts. 
The eradication initiative has been criticised for diverting 
precious and limited financial and human resources away from 
primary health care needs.24 Financially, however, a world free 
of the need for polio vaccine would benefit by saving US$1.5 
billion per year in immunisation costs alone, which could be 
passed on to other health care needs. The alternative option, 
that of controlling polio at a lower level, which relies on 
routine immunisation rather than the more intense eradication 
initiative, has been shown in a recent modelling study to 
potentially result in greater cumulative costs and a far larger 
number of cases.25 
At least as important as the cost-benefit is the enormous 
value in sensitising the general public to the benefits of 
immunisation and in the mobilisation of hundreds of 
thousands of volunteers who could subsequently be motivated 
for other primary health care needs in a future polio-free 
world. Another valuable spin-off of the eradication initiative 
has been the creation of the network of polio laboratories 
worldwide which are already being utilised for other 
programmes which require laboratory support, for example 
measles.
Are other diseases eradicable in the 
future?
A polio eradication success would have the enormous 
benefit of demonstrating that smallpox eradication was not 
a one-off event and that disease eradication is conceptually  
realistic. Measles, in theory, could potentially be targeted 
for eradication. Its only natural host is humans, persistent 
excretion does not occur, it is preventable by a highly effective 
vaccine and it has already been eliminated from several regions 
of the world. As yet there are no serious plans to undertake a 
measles eradication initiative, although targets have been set 
for eliminating measles from several regions in the world. 
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What will now need to change is not to discard the concept 
of eradication of disease because of the unforeseen difficulties 
in the polio eradication initiative, but rather that the definition 
of eradication may need to be revised. Recent concerns about 
smallpox reappearing as a biological weapon have shown that 
even with that relatively easily eradicable disease the need for 
vaccine has reappeared. With polio many developed countries 
will not cease immunising their citizens with TIPV even well 
after the virus has been eradicated for fear of accidental or 
deliberate reappearance of the virus. Eradication could be 
re-defined as the absence of evidence of the presence of an 
organism in the human population, but omitting any reference 
to cessation of control measures or cessation of surveillance. 
Another further theoretical category could now be added, 
that of extinction, which would indicate the permanent and 
absolute absence of an organism from the planet so that control 
measures could confidently be permanently stopped.6 It is 
highly doubtful whether this stage could be reached with any 
infectious organism.
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